Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1948

Hawaiian Equipment Company, Limited v. The
Eimco Corporation : Reply Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Willis W. Ritter; Jesse R. S. Budge; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Hawaiian Equipment Co. Ltd. v. The Eimco Corp., No. 7188 (Utah Supreme Court, 1948).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/885

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

7188

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

HAWAIIAN EQUIPMENT C·OiMIPANY,
LIMITE·D, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Responderrtt,

Case No.

V!.

7188

THE .EIMCO CORPO·RATIO;N, ·a
corporation,
DefenOO!nt amd Appellamt.

REPLY BRIEF O;F APPELLAN·T

F 1;~ I n~ .1.~. ~ D
1

._41

SE?

~.:-

19~-S

-~~--------------------------------

WILLI'S w. RITTER
JE·S.SE R. S. BUD·GE
Atborneys for Defen·da;nt
and A ppelkunt

CLERK, SUPREME COURT,UTAH

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Page
Bartlett-Heard & Cattle Co. v. Harris, 238 Pac. 327, __________________

3

C. J. Vol. 27, 383·-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

3

Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 168, 129 Pac. 619________________

4

Easton v. Thatcher, 7 Utah 99 .. ------------------------------------------------------

3

Eggleston v. Wagner, 46 Mich. 610, 618·---------------------------------------

6

Filley v. Pope, 115 U. S. 213, 29 L. Ed. 372·----------------------------·----

7

Johnson v. Jones, 109 Utah 92, 164 Pac. 893________________________________

4

National Bank of Commerce v. Lambourne, et al, 2 Fed.
( 2d) 23 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7

Northeastern Paper Company v. Concord Paper Company,
212 N. Y .S. 218 _____________ ------------------------------------------------ _______________

3

Zimmerman Bros. & Co. v. First National Bank, 263 N.W. 361

3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

HAWAIIAN EQUIPMENT C·O;M·PANY,
LIMITED, a corporation,
Plaiwt'iff and

Res~p~ondernt,

Case No.

vs.
THE EIMCO
corporation,

7188
CO·RPORATI~)N,

a

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

By their brief, counsel for respondent, in effect, concede the insufficiency of the cablegrams (Exhibits A and
B) standing alone to constitute a written contract, but
they argue that· the deficiencies are supplied by the, oral
conversations 'between the parties prior to the sending of
said ·cablegrams. In .other words, they contend that notwithstanding Exhibit A, ''the memori(J;ndum in w·riVing
of the conbract" signed "by the p~arty vo be charged"
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m·erely says:·'' Reference hammers,'' respondent had the
right to show by parol what hammers and of what makes
and how many of eaeh make EIMCO meant, that is, that
it meant:
"Scaling Hammers

418
1250
140
4
1

Model
Model
Model
Model
Model

K-1 Ingersoll-Rand Co.
F·C Chicago Pneumatic ·Tool ·Co.
MM Independent Pneumatic 'Tool Co.
''Super'' Keller Co.
A Dallet Co.

1813 Total
·Chipping Hammers

708
188
92
22

M·odel
Model
Model
Model

No.
No.
No.
No.

2 Master Pneumatic Tool Co.
2 Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.
200 Ingersoll Rand Co.
2 Keller Co.

1004 Total"
The foregoing is a particular description of the property respondent alleges in its complaint that appellant
by Exhibit A agreed to buy. If counsel's contention is
correct, then the lack of description in the '' men1orandum" is immate·rial and the authorities which hold that.
the ''m·emorandum'' must contain all th·e terms of the
contract, including a designation and descrip,tion of the
property which is the subject of the transaction, are to
be dis~egarded.
The cas·es cited by counsel do not sustain their contention that such deficiencies in the '~ memorandun1 ''
may be supplied by parol. They merely hold that in son1e
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circumstances, parol evidence is admissible to apply a
definibe description ·in ·a memoriandum to particular property. Let us examine the authorities counsel ·cite at pages
15-16 of their brief.
In Bartlett-Heard and Cat,tle Company v. Harris,
238 Pac. 327, the offer to sell described the pro p,erty as
''all the heifers you inspected.'' This language definitely
specified the property. Parol evidence did not add to the
contract, but only applied the designation to the particular property which had theretofore been identified.
In NortheasfAern Paper Compwny v. Q,oncord P·ape.r
C·o., 212 N.Y.S. 218, the description was "all pap·er rolls
stored in seller's warehouse.'' H·ere the property is
definitely described. 'The description could necessarily
mean only certain specific property.
In Zimmerman Bros. and C·ompany vs. First National B·ank, 263 N. W. 3'61, the des-cription was "Park
Ridge Safety Deposit Boxes.'' This could mean only
certain specified boxes. It limits and restricts the designation to particular property.
The principal announced in these cases is thus stated
in 27 C.J. 383:
''Parol evidence is admis~;ible for the purpose
of applying the description in 'the 1nem·orandum
and thus identifying the subject matter of the
contract provided such subject matter is so described in. the n1en1orandum as to be capable of
certain id~n tifica tion ; but parol evidence is not
admissible- to. supply a description of the subject
rna tter_.'' (Italics. ours)
1

This court has itself applied that rule. In Easton v.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

Thatcher, 7 Uta~h 99, the memorandum was as follows:
''Received of J. M. Easton the sum of $10.00
·as ·an· option on one..:half interest of Hyrum
Thatcher of Logan City in horses and ranch ·etc.''
Says the ·court:
''This is equivalent 'to saying 'a ranch in
·which Hyrum Thatcher owns a one-half interest.'
Extrinsic evidence to show that Hyrum Thatcher
owned a one-half interest in a ranch would be
competent, and it would also he competent for
witnesses familiar with the ranch 'to des·cribe it,
giving its boundaries. By such evidenee the contra·ct could be app,lied to the subject matter, and if
the existence of such a ranch was to be so shown,
in the absence of any proof of another ranch in
whi~h Hyrum Thatcher owned a one-half interest,
the subject matter of the contract would be identified and it would not 'be within the. statute of
frauds. I't would also be competent to prove that
Hyrum Thatcher owned a one-half interest in no
other ranch.''
This court approved the foregoingrule in Cummings
v. Niels~on, 42 Utah 157, 168, 129 Pac. 619, and in Johns,on
v. Jones, 109 Utah 92, 164 ·Pac. 893.
But the case at bar is certainly not within that rule.
What is there in the words ''Reference hammers bid
maximum 24 dollars each, scalers 17.50 ·each Honolulu.
Will take all," so that oral testimony could apply this
language to any certain property and especially to the
particular· list of 1jroperty set forth in the co1nplain t?
Exhibit A does not describe any particular . property,
either by models, makes, quantity or location, so as to
make it capable· of:· certain identification ·as none other
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than the particular p·roperty listed in the complaint and
as the property appellant understood to be the
su'bject matter of the contract. If all these omissions can be supplied by parol, then the rule that
the memorandum signed by the party to be charged
shall contain all the terms of the agreement and
a reasonably definite description of the property means
nothing. Furthermore, the evidence shows that Blades,
whom respondent regarded as the man who knew most
about the merchandis·e, says that he saw only samples of
the property and did not know how many of any different make tools were contained in the crates until they
had been moved to and opened at the Salt Lake ar·ea in
Honolulu in the latter part of August. (Rec. pp. 206-207).
How can it be said that the words "Reference hammers"
meant the particular ·property listed in the complaint
when the respondent itself did not know of what. the
property consisted until long after the exchange of cablegrains 1 There was no possibility that the words ''Reference hammers" could mean that par~icular p·'r!operty.
The fact that Exhibit A contains the. words ''Will take
all" does not help to identify the property. All of what?
All the government had for sale 1 All respondent de·cided to buy fro1n the government? All that res·pondent
should de~ide to deliver to appellant? ·The words have
no definite meaning as applied to any particul~-r prop~
erty. Under the universally accepted rule, the "memorandum" must be definite in its terms and conditions and
the property muet be so described that it cannot be one
thing or another. Descriptions such as "the forty acre
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tract of John Davis'' might be shown to be a forty in
Section 36, hut if the evidence showed that he owned
more than one forty, the memorandum would have to be
rejected. The property might be described as ''all the
sacks of sugar in the warehouse of '' B '' or ''all the flour
inspected by you'' or by any other phraseology that
would necessarily limit the identification so that only
certain property could possibly be covered by the writing. In any su·ch case, parol is permissible to apply the
'vords to ·su0h ·particular property, but ''Reference hamIners'' does not identify any particular group, kind,
model, or make of hammers, or where located, or the
quantity thereof. Certainly those words do not identify
the part£cular numbers, models, makes or ki·nds ·of hammers respon~dent alleges in its comp·laint. that appellant
agreed" irn writing" to buy.
As stated in our quotation from Corpus Juris, parol
evidence is not permissible to ·supply a description. The
true rule 'is well stated by the Supren1e Court ·of Michigan
in Eggleston v. Wagner, 46 Mich. 610, 618:
.'' 'A further o'bjection is that the proposal
did not sufficiently describe the real estate to
satisfy the Statute of Frauds. The general principle is not questioned. The degree of certainty
with which the .premises must be denoted is de. fined in many books, and the cases are extre1nely
numerous in which the subject has· be·en illustrated.
T'hey are not all harmonious. Bu't. they agree in
this, that it is not essential that the description
have such particulars and tokens of identifiC'ation
as to render a .reso:rt to extrinsic aid ·entirely needless when the writing· comes to he applied to the
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subject matter. The tern1s may be abstract and of
a general nature, but they Inust be sufficien't to fit
and con1prehend the p·ropert~T which is the subject
of the transaction; so that W'ith the assistance of
external evidence, the description, without being
contradicted or added to, can be connected with
and applied to the very property intended and
to the exclusion of all other property'.''
"\V.e invite the court at this point to again refer to
the cases cited on pages 11 to 20 of our first brief as to
what must be embodied in the ''memorandum'' .. Here,
accordJ.ing to tlz e complaint the goods were sold by specific description, so many of each make and model, so
this is particularly a case 'vhere the specific description
of the property or some language definitely designating
it by location or other means of identification, should
have appeared in the ''memorandum.''
At page 7 of our brief, we cited the case of N~ation4l
Bank -of Commerce v. Lambourne, et ·al, 2 Fed. (2d) 23,
in support of the recognized principle that in construing
comn1ercial contracts, every word must be given effect,
and that, therefore, the words, ''bid maximum'-', in Exhibit A are not to be disregarded or interpreted as an
"offer to buy", when such an interpretation is different
from what those words imply. Counsel for appellant
(Br. p. 9) assert that in the reversal of this case by the
Supreme Court of the United States, the principle for
which we contend was repudiated. Such is not ·the case.
The majority. opinion merely distinguishes the Lambourne case from Filley v. Pope, 115 u . s. 213, 29 I.1. Ed.
372, wherein the court clearly recognizes the principle
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to he applied in the construction of commercial contracts.
Indeed, in the majority opinion in the Lambourne case,
it is said:
''As was said in Harrison v. Fortlage, 116
U. S. 57, 63, 16 S. Ct. 488, 489, 40 L. Ed. 616:
'' 'The court is no't at liberty either to disregard words used by the parties descriptive of the
subj·ect matter or ·of any material in-cident or to
insert words "rhich the parties have not made use
of'."
Moreover, ·Chief Justice Stone in a dissenting opinion in the Lambourne case says that all of the members
of the Supreme Court were in agreement upon the principal to which we ref.er. Chief Justice Stone says at the
end of his dissent, concurred in by three other justices:
''The provision in the letter of credit that
conditions embodied in this credit must be adhered to, otherwise payment will not be effected,
only exp!ress·es the rule with which we all agree
that liability upon a mercantile contract 1nay be
established only by strict compliance 'vith its conditions." (Citing Filley v. Pope and other cases) ..
In answer to appellant's contention that there was
no meeting of minds, and therefore no contract, because
appellant by Exhibit A n1eant one thing, that is, an
authorization to bid, while respondent claims it regarded
said exhibit as an offer to buy, counsel. for respondent
urge that when. Exhibits A and B are considered ''in
the light of the circun1stances under which they were
made," (App. Br. p. 25) and "in the light of their (the
partie-s') knowledge and the attendant circumstances,"
(App. Br. 31) a me-eting of minds is disclosed, and eounSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sel quote exeerpts from the testimony of MacNaughton
as to what were the "attendant cireun1stances."
. .\g-ain a.t page ·7 of its brief, respondent states:
''The und i-s pu,ted evidence showing the situation of the parties and surrounding circumstances
taken together 'vith the exchange of cables (Ex.
A. & B.) establish that Ein1co agreed to purchase
from Haw··aiian Equip1nent Company the en't.ire
quantity of certain pneumatic tools, etc." (Italics
ours).
·The record ""ill disclos·e that .llfr. Rosenblatt controverts the statements of MacNaughton as to the "surrounding circumstances'' and as to what was said in the
telephone conversations and the evidence is not undisputed that "Ein1co agreed to purchase'' etc. Rosenblatt
iet;tified positively that he made no proposal to buy and
that respondent did not offer appellant anything. ( Rec.
p. 242). The "surrounding circumstances" as stated by
~lacNaught on is only his version, which is no more
'"·or!hy of acceptance than ~Ir. Rosenblatt's. Furthermore, respondent insisted at the trial that the two cables
constituted the contract that ''cannot be modified by
previous parol conversations,'' ( Rec. pp. 236, 254, 259)
and that any testin1ony with respect to the relations
between Rosenblatt and Winehei"g for the purp·ose of
~bowing an agency and that, therefore, Exhibit A was
Inerely an authorization to bid \Yas not admissible. (Rec.
p. 2.)4). This objection was by the court sustained. Now,
however, in order to make it appear that a contract was
entered into, counsel \Yant this court to accept oral stateSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ments made prior to -the cablegrams (that is, respondent's version of those conversations) to supplement the
cables as to description of property and terms of the
contract and to interpret the words "bid maximum" as
meaning" offer to buy."
At page 8 of their brief, counsel assert:
"'The minutest search of the record will fail
to reveal that there was any serious effort to present, during 'the trial of this cause, any such issue
to the ·effect that while defendant denies it n1ade
a contract to purchase from plaintiff, still it admits making a contract appointing plaintiff i'ts
agent to acquire these goods from the government."
It is to be regretted that counsel. will make such a
misstatement. ·T·he fact is, as disclosed by the record,
that appellant made several offers to prove by Rosenb~
and by Wineberg that appellant intended by Exhibit A
to appoint respondent agent to make a bid to the government" of the maximum figures stated in Exhibit A
(Rec~ pp. 236, 253, 254, 259, 27 4).
Again counsel at the same page of the brief states:
· '' Eimco had made a proposal through defendant's San Francisco office to buy fron1 plaintiff.''
This statement is likewise disputed by Rosenb&l~r
(R:ec. p~ 242); and even if the staten1ent · w:ere true, it
could not aid respondent when the validity of the written contract, which it alleges in its complaint, depends
upon the contents of· the two· cablegrarns, which during
the trial,· counsel for respondent repeatedly contended
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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could not be modified, supplen1ented or changed by parol.
K ow, as to Exhibit B. Respondent has a difficult
time indeed trying to establish that Exhibit B was an
unoonditional -acceptance. How can it be said that in an
absolute sale to appellant (if there was a sale, which we
deny) it \vas in1plied that appellant by Exhibit A offered
to buy only on condition that respondent could secure
delivery from surplus~ Th·ere is no suggestion in Exhibit ..~.:\. that the offer (if there was an offer to buy,
\vhich \Ye deny) \tvas conditional upon the delivery of
1nerchandise to respondent. Respondent accepted the
offer (if it was an offer) upon that condition because
it wanted to play safe. When it no\v realizes the legal
effect of the wording of Exhibit B, it says that a~ppellant
was bound if respondent did secure delivery, but respondent would not have been bound if it had not. The
language, "in accordance with your cable, Hawaiian
Equipment Company sells you subject to delivery from
s?.trplus", is so obviously outside of any ·suggestion in
the Hoffer'' (Exhibit A) that it could not possibly give
rise to a contract.
Respondent n1ay have intended that it should be
bound only if it could obtain delivery from surplus, and
it clearly expressed that state of mind and intention in
,, 'Exhibit B"; but appellant gave no indication in Exhibit
A that it was doing business on that basis and respondent cannot base its right to recovery on a so-called
in1plierl term of the contract to which appellant never
as~cnted, which is not alleged in the complaint and
\\~hich never entered counsel's mind until they came to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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appreciate respondent's predicam-ent under a conditional
acceptance. After Exhibit A was receiv~ed and before
respondent dispatched Exhibit B, it ·had -already received
the assurance of the government of. the sale to it of
the tools held in surplus. MacNaughton, president
of respondent company testified:
Q. Now, Mr. MacNaughton, upon the receipt of
the cablegram from Eimeo Corporation, which
you have testified you received on or about
August 8, 1946, you replied 'by cable. I believe that is the following day, August 9th~

A.

Yes.

Q.

If I remember correctly. Now at the tim·e,
Mr. MacNaughton, you sent that cable which
says, 'Hawaiian Equipment Company sells
you', and so forth~

A.

Y~es.

Q.

Did you own the tools in question

here~

A.· Yes.

Q. You had aequired title to

them~

A.

As soon as we made the-·or received the
cable. from Eimco Corporation saying, setting the price, and saying ''Will take all,
Honolulu,'' we called the ·Surplus Property
Office, the man who was in. charge of the
division of these tools, and told him we were
buying thos-e tools fro1n hjm at the price set
by the Government. Ile said, ''All right, they
, are yours." (Rec. p. 107).

And yet counsel argue· that it can be implied from
appellant's so-called offer that the contract was to be

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
conditional on respondent's ability to s·ecure the ·p,rop~erty
from surplus.
At page 19 of the brief, counsel n1ake the interesting statement that the words •' subject to delivery from
surplus'' are immaterial to prevent a binding contract
because '• Eimco immediately acquir·ed the- goods upon
receipt of the offer." If respondent knew that to be
true, and Eimco had already acquired the goods, why
qualify an absolute sale (if there was a sale) by saying
it would only be a sale if respondent secured delivery
from surplus?
We again refer to the authorities quoted by us in
our first brief upon the question of conditional acceptance. If they do not apply to this case, then there is
no state of facts to which such rule could ap:p,ly.
Counsel are so hard pressed on this matter of conditional acceptance that they must even rely upon a
remark of counsel for appellant at the trial when m·oving
for a directed verdict. They quote and italicize:
''Conceding that said tw~o cables constitut.ed
an offer ancl accept{J)'YICe to buy and sell, they did
no't result in a valid contract because there was
no meeting of minds." (Respondent's Brief, p.
25).

Of course, this 'vas only a concession for the sake of
the alternative ground of the motion. It is idle to regard
it as an admission that there was an offer and acceptance.
Counsel complain that the points argued by appellant that Exhibit B was a conditional acceptance and
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that "f.o.b." in Exhibit C imports a new term not responsive to Exhibit A, are raised for the first time on
appeal (Brief p. 18-21). They also remark that appellant
"has brought forth some new ideas on appeal such as
the assertion that the acceptance was conditional because 'it imported an entirely new tenn in the bargain
contrary to what was intended by def·endant. '' (Brief
p. 23).
If appellant was late in discovering these defects in
th~ so-called acceptance, we may assume that respondent
was equally at fault; otherwis·e, with their usual candor,
they would long ago have confessed that no case could
be successfully maintained on such a state of facts. However, we give them credit for saying all that can he said
in justification of a verdict, in support of which nothing
can be said. They argue that "f.o.b." in Exhibit B is
not a new term; that the term is well understood in
trade and ''meant that plaintiff would deliver the goods
sold at Honolulu on board a vessel without charge to
Eimco." (Br. p. 21). But is anything said in Exhibit
A about "f.o.b." ~ Who was to designate the vess·el?
Had respondent the right to deliver the goods on any
vessel of its own selection~ Can the additional "f.o.b.,
provision also be implied when appellant by Exhibit A
says nothing n1ore than ''Honolulu''~ l\fay 've not presume that 'appellant desired to determine for itself by
what· line, when, upon what terms and under what insurance the merchandise would he shipped to the mainland~ How can it be said that·" f.o.b~" does not import
a new term into the con~ract, just as ''subject delivery
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from surplus'' is a new term 1
Taking the exhibits, A and B, upon which respondent
1nust rely as the ''contract in writjng'' whereby appellant offered to buy and respondent sold the particular
property itemized itn the complaJint, no other conclusion
is possible but that Exhibit A is so uncertain and incomplete as to be worthless as a ''memorandum'' under
the statute, but if by any sort of reasoning, however
unsound, it ran be regarded as an ''offer", nevertheless
Exhibit B constituted no acceptance and, therefore, no
con tract ever ""'"as created.
In conclusion, counsel requests the court to apply
the
'·Fundamental judicial principle that where
the evidence considered as a whole manifests an
intention of the parties to arrive at a bargain, a
construction will be given to the transaction, if
possibhe, which will- establish a vali<;l contract
rather than defeat one." (Br. p. 32) (Italics ours).
Of course, there was some intention of the parties
to do some kind of business with each other, else Exhibits A and B 'vould never have been sent. Appellant contends that it intended Exhibit A as
a~ authorization for respondent to bid. R-espondent
says that Exhibit A meant "offer to buy." Respondent
asks for the adoption of its construction based on parol
evidence which is controverted by appellant. Can such
an uncertainty in the writing be cured by parol' Appellant further contends that Exhibit A designates no property then identifi·ed or known to either party, or capable
of being definitely ascertained, and the proof shows
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that even respondent did not consider the property definitely ascertained until w·eeks after Exhibit A was received, that is to say, after the property had been unpacked in the Salt Lake area at Honolulu. Especially is
it true· that Exhibit A could not possibly be considered
as identifYing the particular property listed in the complaint and which is there described in such detail. The
exhibit as a whole is not a sufficient memor01Yitdum of the
contract.- signed by the party to be charged, embodying
with certainty· ·all the necessary terms of the contract.
Exhibit B is certainly insufficient as an acceptance,
even if Exhlbit A was an offer, which it was not. Exhibit
B is conditional and imports new terms not suggested or
in1plied by Exhibit A. Therefore, even applying the
''fundamental judicial principles,'' it is not possible to
make a contract out of the transaction between appellant
and respondent in this case.
We respectfully submit that- the judgment should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

,V. RITTER
JESSE R. S. BUDGE
Attor-neys for Defendant
and A1Jpellant
WII_.~LIS
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